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In the present study, we tested whether Muslim minority members are more suscep-
tible to conspiracy theories than majority members in the Netherlands. We examined
conspiracy theories that are relevant (portraying the Muslim community as victim or
Jewish people as perpetrators) and irrelevant for participants' Muslim identity (about
the 2007 financial crisis, and other theories such as that the moon landings were
fake). Results revealed that Muslims believed both identity‐relevant and irrelevant
conspiracy theories more strongly than non‐Muslims. These differences could not
be attributed to the contents of Muslim faith: Ethnic minority status exerted similar
effects independent of Muslim identity. Instead, evidence suggested that feelings of
both personal and group‐based deprivation independently contribute to belief in con-
spiracy theories. We conclude that feelings of deprivation lead marginalized minority
members to perceive the social and political system as rigged, stimulating belief in
both identity‐relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories.
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Many minority members face real problems such as marginalization,
discrimination, and economic hardship. These problems may inspire a
range of less realistic conspiracy theories, however. Although conspir-
acies that harm minorities can and do occur (e.g., theTuskegee Syphilis
experiment), large portions of African Americans believe far‐fetched
theories such as that birth control is a form of Black genocide, a con-
spiracy theory that predicts decreased contraceptive use (Thorburn &
Bogart, 2005; see also Bird & Bogart, 2003). Furthermore, Black as
opposed to White Americans more strongly believed conspiracy theo-
ries such as that AIDS was created in the laboratory to infect Black
people or that the government deliberately makes drugs available in
Black neighborhoods. These findings were attributable to perceived
system blame, that is, the extent to which participants blamed the
realistic problems that the African American community faces to prej-
udice and discrimination (Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine,g the study
wileyonlinelibrary.com1999). Conspiracy theories hence provide an explanatory framework
for the predicaments of marginalized minority groups.
Most previous research on this topic is restricted, however, by
focusing on explicitly racial conspiracy theories involving a White plot
that harms the Black community. This approach may not appreciate
the full implications of minority group status for the societal phenom-
enon of conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories are defined as allega-
tions that a group of actors colludes in secret to reach malevolent
goals (Bale, 2007), and these goals may or may not be focused on
harming the minority group in question. What does minority status
imply for the tendency to believe conspiracy theories that are not
explicitly racial—such as that the U.S. government hides evidence for
the existence of extraterrestrial life or that the Apollo moon landings
were filmed in aTV studio? Preliminary findings are mixed and suggest
that while ethnic minorities are particularly susceptible to racially rele-
vant conspiracy theories, they also show an increased susceptibility to
at least some conspiracy theories irrelevant for race (Goertzel, 1994).
In the present contribution, we propose that ethnic and Muslim minor-
ities are more likely than majority members to believe both identity‐© 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd./journal/acp 661
662 VAN PROOIJEN ET AL.relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories. Furthermore, we propose
a tentative explanation for this phenomenon, namely, that feelings of
personal and group‐based deprivation independently contribute to
belief in conspiracy theories.2 | MARGINALIZED MINORITIES AND
CONSPIRACY THEORIES
Minority group members are likely to suffer from societal deprivation
in at least two complementary ways. First, they may experience per-
sonal deprivation: not feeling regarded as a full‐fledged member of
society. Second, they may perceive group‐based deprivation: The per-
ception that one's minority group as a whole is deprived of equal
opportunities (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Crocker &
Major, 1989). Whereas both levels of deprivation are associated with
negative emotions (e.g., anger) and feelings of injustice, they predict
different outcome variables. For instance, personal deprivation is par-
ticularly associated with individual‐level variables (e.g., self‐percep-
tions), but group‐based deprivation is particularly associated
with group‐level variables (e.g., collective action; see Smith, Pettigrew,
Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Furthermore, perceiving deprivation at
both levels is conceptually distinct from conspiracy beliefs: Unlike
conspiracy theories, such deprivation (a) does not necessarily occur
in secret, (b) is not necessarily produced by a specific group that col-
luded, and (c) is not always intentional (e.g., implicit stereotypes can
lead to unintentional yet realistic deprivation of equality). Yet we pro-
pose that both forms of deprivation are relevant for perceivers' sus-
ceptibility to conspiracy theories.
Personal deprivation is an aversive experience that predicts
increased motivation to make sense of one's life circumstances
(Park, 2010). The negative emotions that are associated with personal
deprivation activate a suspicious mindset that approaches the social
environment with scrutiny. Consistently, people increasingly believe
conspiracy theories to the extent that they experience emotions also
associated with increased sense‐making motivation, such as feeling
out of control (Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild, 2010; Van Prooijen &
Acker, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), subjective uncertainty
(Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015),
and fear (Grzesiak‐Feldman, 2013). Moreover, personal experiences
of social exclusion increase belief in conspiracy theories (Graeupner
& Coman, 2017). These insights suggest that feelings of personal dep-
rivation are related with basic social‐cognitive processes that increases
susceptibility to conspiracy theories.
Although this hypothesized role of personal deprivation dovetails
with research on conspiracy theories, it is unlikely to be the only factor
necessary to understand the relationship between minority status and
conspiracy theories. One study found strong conspiracy theories
among a sample of African Americans independent of how affluent
individual participants were (Simmons & Parsons, 2005). The
presumed role of group‐based deprivation is consistent with theoriz-
ing that there is a social dimension to conspiracy theories
(Douglas, Cichocka, & Sutton, 2017; Van Prooijen & Van Lange,
2014). Specifically, a conspiracy essentially is a group of people (e.g.,
politicians; CEOs) plotting to harm a different group (e.g., fellowcitizens). It has hence been noted that hostile intergroup relations
are associated with conspiracy theories. Research indeed supports
the idea that threats to a valued in‐group predicts belief in conspiracy
theories (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski,
2016; Van Prooijen, 2016; Van Prooijen & Van Dijk, 2014).
Both forms of deprivation have one common denominator: Mem-
bers of a dominant majority group are responsible for the marginalized
positions that perceivers and their group have in society. It therefore
stands to reason that both forms of deprivation promote the percep-
tion that majority group representatives are evil entities that are
involved in malevolent plots. We argue that these suspected plots
may have goals that are not only racial but also nonracial in content.
Acceptance of one conspiracy theory promotes a worldview assuming
that hostile conspiracies are responsible for many other events in the
world, and research indeed finds that one of the best predictors of
belief in one conspiracy theory is belief in a different, unrelated con-
spiracy theory (Abalakina‐Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999;
Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2011; Swami, Chamorro‐Premuzic, &
Furnham, 2010; Van Prooijen, Douglas, & De Inocencio, 2018; Wood,
Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). These arguments suggest that minority
members are more likely than majority group members to assume that
the social and political system they live in is rigged, prompting beliefs
in both identity‐relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories.
In the present research, we examined these ideas by sending a
questionnaire to two research panels in the Netherlands, of which
one was expected to contain many Muslim minorities. We anticipated
that Muslim minorities in Dutch society would experience both forms
of deprivation, and hence focused on conspiracy theories that varied
in relevance to explain marginalization of Muslims. As conspiracy the-
ories relevant for participants' Muslim identities, we measured belief in
conspiracy theories that portray Muslims as victims and conspiracy
theories that portray Jewish people as perpetrators. As conspiracy
theories less relevant for participants' Muslim identities, we assessed
economic conspiracy theories (e.g., about the 2007 financial crisis)
and a range of other conspiracy theories (e.g., about the moon land-
ings). Besides Muslim minority status, we also included participants'
ethnic minority status to explore whether being an ethnic minority—
independent of Muslim identity—would predict increased conspiracy
beliefs. Finally, we measured belonging in Dutch society as a proxy
for personal deprivation (i.e., low belonging reflects feelings that one
is not a full‐fledged Dutch citizen) and group‐based deprivation.3 | METHOD
3.1 | Participants and design
We conducted the study in two different samples that were run in
parallel (May/June 2016). Data collection was coordinated by
“Kieskompas (“Election compass,”) a Dutch political research organiza-
tion that acts in line with the strict regulations of the Dutch Authority
for the Protection of Personal Information (“Autoriteit
Persoonsgegevens”; registration number m1457347) and with the
ethical norms of VU Amsterdam. To acquire as many ethnic and Mus-
lim minorities as possible, we sent out an e‐mail link to a panel of
2We dropped a fourteenth item (“The AIDS virus was created and disseminated
deliberately by the U.S. government to wipe out homosexuals and the Black
population”) from the analyses as we regarded its identity‐relevance ambiguous:
It describes a conspiracy against minority groups, but not the ones under inves-
tigation here. It is noteworthy, however, that on this item the effects of ethnic-
ity and Muslim identity were significant, and in the predicted direction
(ps < 0.003).
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specifically focuses on reducing discrimination and improving ethnic
minority rights and that is popular among Muslim minorities in the
Netherlands (Sample 1). Second, we sent out a link through social
media utilizing a “snowballing” method to a variety of public sites,
designed to get a mostly Dutch Caucasian sample that was diverse
in terms of education and social‐economic background (Sample 2).
We stopped collecting data once no further responses came in, and
prior to any analyses. We had a total of 545 cases in our initial dataset;
however, a lot of these cases showed attrition and missing values. We
therefore selected only those participants with no missing values on
our key dependent variable (belief in conspiracy theories), rendering
a final sample of 355 participants (180 men, 168 women, 7 not indi-
cated; Mage = 27.33 years; SD = 9.41; Sample 1 n = 225, Sample 2
n = 130).1 This final sample yields 95% power for a small‐to‐medium
effect size ( f 2 = .04).
In both samples, we asked for participants' ethnicity and religion.
To investigate ethnicity, we classified participants into Dutch
Caucasian (n = 113) and ethnic minority (n = 237; five missing values).
As intended, most ethnic minority participants were from Sample 1
(200 ethnic minority, 25 Caucasian Dutch). Most ethnic minorities in
Sample 1 were either Turkish Dutch (n = 86) or Moroccan Dutch
(n = 81)—two prevalent and frequently stigmatized minority groups
in Dutch society. The remaining ethnic minorities in Sample 1 were
Asian (n = 2), mixed race (n = 10), Middle Eastern/Arab (n = 3), and
“Other” (n = 18). In Sample 2, the majority of participants were Cauca-
sian Dutch (n = 88). The ethnic minority participants in Sample 2 were
Asian (n = 2), Black (n = 3), mixed race (n = 16), Middle Eastern/Arab
(n = 3), Turkish (n = 1), and “Other” (n = 11). The remaining four partic-
ipants in Sample 2 indicated “prefer not to say” and were coded as
missing value.
Furthermore, we asked for participants' religion, and separately
coded whether or not participants were Muslim or non‐Muslim. Our
sample had 146 non‐Muslim participants and 205 Muslim participants
(four missing values). Although most Muslim participants were also
ethnic minority members, we had all four ethnicity × religiosity combi-
nations represented in our sample (Dutch Caucasian/non‐Muslim
n = 98; ethnic minority/non‐Muslim n = 44; Dutch Caucasian/Muslim
n = 14; ethnic minority/Muslim n = 191).
3.2 | Measures
3.2.1 | Conspiracy theories
We asked participants how probable or improbable they found 13
conspiracy theories (1 = Highly improbable, 5 = Highly probable). Two
items were aggregated into an index of Muslim conspiracy theories
(“ISIS was created by the United States and Israel, in order to create
chaos in the Middle East and make Islam look bad” and “The United
States carried out the attacks of 11 September 2001 themselves, in
order to invade countries in the Middle East and make Islam look
bad”; r = 0.77, p < 0.001). Two additional items were combined into
an index of Jewish conspiracy theories (“The holocaust was largely1We report all data exclusions and all the measures that were assessed in both
samples. We note here that each sample also contained a limited number of
additional, sample‐specific measures for different research purposes.made up in order to secure the State of Israel” and “Jewish bankers
control the world economy and most governments”; r = 0.55,
p < 0.001). We measured economic conspiracy theories with four items
(α = 0.84; “The economic crisis of 2007 was created deliberately by
bankers to make lower and middle income groups poorer, and them-
selves richer”; “The medical and pharmaceutical industry deliberately
withhold a cure against cancer, in order to continue earning money
from cancer patients”; “Big companies and financial institutions are
closely connected with politics in order to weaken labor unions and
decrease social securities”; and “Financial organizations such as the
World Bank, IMF, and the European Central Bank are under the super-
vision of major companies to make the rich richer and the poor
poorer”). The remaining five items formed an index of other conspiracy
theories (α = 0.83; “All the important media companies are dominated
by a left‐wing elite that continuously promotes left‐wing politics”;
“Americans keep UFOs that landed on Earth hidden at an air base in
Roswell”; “The Apollo‐moon landings were fake and filmed by Ameri-
cans in a studio”; “A secret society—the Illuminati—has controlled most
governments for centuries in order to form one world government”;
and “Princess Diana was murdered by the British Royal family because
she knew too many secrets about this family”).2
3.2.2 | Background variables
We measured political ideology as control variable (1 = left wing,
11 = right wing). Furthermore, we also measured education level of
participants (1 = University Master to 7 = Primary or No Education;
recoded such that high scores represent higher education levels.
An eighth category read “Do not know/will not say” and was coded
as missing).
3.2.3 | Personal and group‐based deprivation
Given that we expected most ethnic and Muslim minority participants
in Sample 1, we asked for personal and group‐based deprivation only
in that sample. To measure group‐based deprivation, we asked the fol-
lowing four questions (1 = Strongly disagree, 4 = Strongly agree): “The
hatred against Muslims increases in the Netherlands”; “Muslims
increasingly are being discriminated in the Netherlands”; “I believe
Islam is being suppressed in the West (i.e., Europe and America)”;
and “I believe that Dutch people with a migration background are
being suppressed in the Netherlands.” These items were averaged into
a reliable scale of group‐based deprivation (α = 0.81).3 As an index of
personal deprivation, we measured participants' feelings of belonging-
ness within the Netherlands through the following item: “To what
extent do you feel like a Dutch citizen?” Participants responded to this
item on a slider ranging from 0 (absolutely not) to 100 (I feel completely3We excluded three additional items of group‐based deprivation for being con-
ceptually confounded with conspiracy theories (e.g., “The political elite in the
Netherlands tries to defame Islam”) and one item for having many (i.e., 200)
missing values.
TABLE 1 Hierarchical regression results—The relationships between ethnicity, Muslim identity, and belief in conspiracy theories
Type of conspiracy theory
Muslim Jewish Economic Other
B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B
Step 1
Gender 0.25 (0.15) [−0.04, 0.54] 0.07 (0.14) [−0.20, 0.33] −0.02 (0.11) [−0.23, 0.19] 0.25 (0.11)* [0.05, 0.46]
Age −0.01 (0.01) [−0.03, 0.01] −0.00 (0.01) [−0.02, 0.01] 0.01 (0.01) [−0.01, 0.02] 0.01 (0.01) [−0.01, 0.02]
Ideology 0.01 (0.03) [−0.05, 0.07] 0.02 (0.03) [−0.04, 0.07] 0.03 (0.02) [−0.01, 0.07] 0.05 (0.02)* [0.01, 0.09]
Education −0.22 (0.07)** [−0.35, −0.09] −0.22 (0.06)*** [−0.34, −0.10] −0.18 (0.05)*** [−0.28, −0.09] −0.21 (0.05)*** [−0.30, −0.12]
Step 2
Ethnicity −0.26 (0.09)** [−0.43, −0.08] −0.22 (0.08)** [−0.38, −0.07] −0.24 (0.07)** [−0.38, −0.10] −0.18 (0.07)** [−0.32, −0.05]
Muslim −0.57 (0.09)*** [−0.74, −0.40] −0.55 (0.08)*** [−0.70, −0.40] −0.20 (0.07)** [−0.33, −0.07] −0.23 (0.07)*** [−0.36, −0.10]
Note. N = 355.
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 Means and standard deviations of belief in various con-
spiracy theories as function of ethnicity and Muslim identity
664 VAN PROOIJEN ET AL.Dutch). Belongingness and group‐based deprivation were moderately
and negatively correlated (r = −0.25, p < 0.001).Type of conspiracy theory
Muslim Jewish Economic Other
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Ethnicity
Dutch Caucasian 2.70 1.30 2.26 1.08 2.98 0.98 2.45 0.99
Ethnic minority 4.00 1.14 3.41 1.10 3.71 0.89 3.08 0.91
Muslim identity
Non‐Muslim 2.74 1.29 2.29 1.11 3.10 1.00 2.51 1.00
Muslim 4.17 1.03 3.57 0.99 3.74 0.86 3.12 0.874 | RESULTS
We analyzed the four conspiracy theories with hierarchical regression
analyses. In Step 1, we entered the control variables gender, age, polit-
ical ideology, and education. In Step 2, we entered the key predictor
variables. All results reported below were similar if we ran the analyses
without control variables. The regression models revealed no evidence
for multicollinearity (all variance inflation factors <1.90).
Note. All ratings were on 5‐point scales, with higher ratings indicating
stronger belief in conspiracy theories.
4We also ran a 2 (Muslim identity) × 2 (ethnicity) × 4 (conspiracy theory; within‐
subjects) analysis. This revealed a significant Muslim identity × conspiracy the-
ory interaction, F (3, 340) = 19.86, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15, but no ethnicity × con-
spiracy theory interaction, F < 1. This suggests that the effects of Muslim
identity, but not ethnicity, are stronger for identity‐relevant than identity‐irrele-
vant conspiracy theories.
5Note that it was impossible to analyze ethnicity and Muslim identity separately,
as Sample 2 contained only four Muslim participants. Also note that a similar
analysis on Sample 1 is problematic, as Sample 1 only contains 10 majority
group members (i.e., Caucasian and non‐Muslim).4.1 | Ethnicity and Muslim identity
To analyze the independent effects of ethnicity and Muslim identity,
we effect‐coded both variables (ethnicity 1 = Dutch Caucasian,
−1 = ethnic minority; Muslim identity 1 = non‐Muslim, −1 = Muslim).
We then added these variables in Step 2 of the regression models.
The regression results are displayed in Table 1. Step 1 was signif-
icant for all conspiracy theories: for Muslim conspiracy theories
(R2 = .04), F (4, 329) = 3.79, p = 0.005; for Jewish conspiracy theories
(R2 = 0.04), F (4, 329) = 3.47, p = 0.009; for economic conspiracy the-
ories (R2 = 0.06), F (4, 330) = 4.89, p = 0.001; and for other conspiracy
theories (R2 = 0.09), F (4, 330) = 8.19, p < 0.001. These effects were
largely due to strong effects of education on all types of conspiracy
theories, indicating that higher education levels predict decreased
belief in conspiracy theories. This finding is consistent with previous
research (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016; Van
Prooijen, 2017). Of the remaining control variables, we found effects
of ideology and gender only on the “other” conspiracy theories, not
on Islamic, Jewish, or economic conspiracy theories (see Table 1).
More important for the present purposes, Step 2 was significant
for all conspiracy theories: forMuslim conspiracy theories (ΔR2 = 0.28),
F (2, 327) = 66.70, p < 0.001; for Jewish conspiracy theories
(ΔR2 = 0.29), F (2, 327) = 71.89, p < 0.001; for economic conspiracy
theories (ΔR2 = 0.14), F (2, 328) = 29.24, p < 0.001; and for other con-
spiracy theories (ΔR2 = 0.12), F (2, 328) = 25.34, p < 0.001. Both eth-
nicity and Muslim identity were independent significant predictors inthe regression model of all conspiracy theories (Table 1). The means
are displayed inTable 2 and indicate that ethnic and Muslim minorities
believe conspiracy theories more strongly, both for theories that are
directly relevant for participants' Muslim identity (Muslim and Jewish
conspiracy theories) and for theories unspecific for ethnic or Muslim
minorities (economic and other conspiracy theories).4
As Sample 1 was drawn from a specific political party, we also
analyzed the effects of minority status only in Sample 2. We first dis-
tinguished between majority members (i.e., Caucasian and non‐Mus-
lim; n = 88) and minority members (ethnic minority, Muslim, or both;
n = 37).5 Then, we conducted regression analyses with the control var-
iables in Step 1, and minority status (effect coded: majority = 1, minor-
ity = −1) added in Step 2. Step 1 was significant for all four conspiracy
theories (0.12 < R2s < 0.24); 4.22 < F s(4, 114) < 8.97;
0.004 < ps < 0.001, which was due to strong education effects on all
dependent variables (−0.43 < βs < −0.31; ps < 0.001), although age
TABLE 3 Hierarchical regression results—The relationships between feelings of belongingness within Dutch society, group‐based deprivation,
and belief in conspiracy theories (Sample 1)
Type of conspiracy theory
Muslim Jewish Economic Other
B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B B (SE) 95% CI of B
Step 1
Gender 0.16 (0.16) [−0.16, 0.47] −0.02 (0.15) [−0.32, 0.28] −0.12 (0.13) [−0.38, 0.13] 0.16 (0.13) [−0.10, 0.42]
Age −0.01 (0.01) [−0.03, 0.01] 0.00 (0.01) [−0.01, 0.02] 0.01 (0.01) [−0.01, 0.03] −0.00 (0.01) [−0.02, 0.01]
Ideology 0.00 (0.03) [−0.06, 0.06] 0.02 (0.03) [−0.03, 0.08] 0.02 (0.03) [−0.03, 0.07] 0.05 (0.03) [−0.01, 0.10]
Education −0.08 (0.07) [−0.22, 0.06] −0.09 (0.07) [−0.23, 0.04] −0.08 (0.06) [−0.20, 0.03] −0.15 (0.06)* [−0.26, −0.03]
Minority −0.33 (0.19) [−0.71, 0.04] −0.23 (0.18) [−0.59, 0.13] −0.35 (0.16)* [−0.66, −0.04] −0.07 (0.16) [−0.25, 0.38]
Step 2
Belonging −0.01 (0.00)*** [−0.02, −0.005] −0.01 (0.00)*** [−0.01, −0.00] −0.01 (0.00)*** [−0.01, −0.005] −0.01 (0.00)*** [−0.01, −0.005]
Group Depr. 0.42 (0.13)** [0.16, 0.68] 0.38 (0.13)** [0.13, 0.63] 0.31 (0.11)** [0.10, 0.52] 0.24 (0.11)* [0.02, 0.46]
Note. N = 225.
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.
VAN PROOIJEN ET AL. 665was also significant for economic (β = 0.18, p = 0.037) and other con-
spiracy theories (β = 0.22, p = 0.011). Minority status (Step 2), then,
was significant for all conspiracy theories: Muslim conspiracy theories
(ΔR2 = 0.06), F (1, 113) = 8.42, p = 0.004 (majorityM = 2.37, SD = 1.10;
minorityM = 3.26, SD = 1.33); Jewish conspiracy theories, (ΔR2 = 0.04),
F (1, 113) = 5.51, p = 0.021 (majority M = 1.98, SD = 0.89; minority
M = 2.64, SD = 1.28); economic conspiracy theories, (ΔR2 = 0.05),
F (1, 113) = 8.04, p = 0.005 (majority M = 2.85, SD = 0.90; minority
M = 3.53, SD = 0.95); other conspiracy theories, (ΔR2 = 0.04), F (1,
113) = 5.43, p = 0.022 (majority M = 2.23, SD = 0.85; minority
M = 2.76, SD = 0.91). These findings suggest that the effects observed
here indeed are due to minority status and not party affiliation.4.2 | Personal and group‐based deprivation
We then analyzed whether in Sample 1 (which consisted mostly of
ethnic and Muslim minority members) personal and group‐based dep-
rivation would predict conspiracy theories. This sample yields 95%
power for a small‐to‐medium effect size ( f 2 = 0.07). We entered the
control variables and minority status in Step 1, after which we entered
belonging and group‐based deprivation in Step 2. The regression
results are displayed in Table 3.
Step 1 was nonsignificant for Muslim conspiracy theories
(R2 = 0.04), F (5, 196) = 1.64, p = 0.150, Jewish conspiracy theories
(R2 = 0.02), F < 1, and economic conspiracy theories (R2 = 0.05),
F (5, 196) = 1.87, p = 0.102, and it was significant for other conspiracy
theories (R2 = 0.06), F (5, 196) = 2.44, p = 0.036. Intriguingly, in Sam-
ple 1, the effects of education did not emerge for three out of four
conspiracy theories. Although not a direct purpose of the present
research, this finding is consistent with previous arguments that the
relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs may not
emerge in populations that suffer from group‐based deprivation
(see Van Prooijen, 2017; p. 57).66The education × minority status interaction in the entire sample was nonsignif-
icant for Muslim and Jewish conspiracy theories (β = −0.06 and β = −0.06,
respectively; ps > 0.23) but significant for economic (β = −0.17, p = 0.001) and
other conspiracy theories (β = −0.13, p = 0.014).Step 2, then, was significant for all four conspiracy theories: for
Muslim conspiracy theories (ΔR2 = 0.15), F (2, 194) = 17.54,
p < 0.001, for Jewish conspiracy theories (ΔR2 = 0.13), F (2,
194) = 15.10, p < 0.001, for economic conspiracy theories (ΔR2 = 0.16),
F (2, 194) = 19.11, p < 0.001, and for other conspiracy theories
(ΔR2 = 0.12), F (2, 194) = 13.76, p < 0.001. As can be seen in
Table 3, both forms of deprivation (i.e., decreased belonging and
increased group‐based deprivation) independently predict belief in all
four conspiracy theories. These findings support the idea that feelings
of deprivation at both levels are associated with belief in many con-
spiracy theories—including theories that are not directly relevant for
citizens' minority status.5 | DISCUSSION
The present study found that Dutch Muslims believe conspiracy theo-
ries more strongly than non‐Muslims. We observed this effect not
only on identity‐relevant conspiracy theories (Muslim and Jewish con-
spiracy theories) but also on theories irrelevant for participants' Mus-
lim identity (about the economic crisis, and other conspiracy theories
such as that the Moon landings were fake). Furthermore, the contents
of Muslim faith are a poor explanation for these findings: Ethnic
minority status exerted similar effects on conspiracy beliefs, indepen-
dent of Muslim identity. A more plausible explanation is offered by our
findings on personal (i.e., low feelings belongingness in Dutch society)
and group‐based deprivation (i.e., the feeling that Muslims and ethnic
minorities as a group are discriminated against): Both feelings of dep-
rivation were strong predictors of conspiracy beliefs. These findings
suggest that both forms of deprivation independently contribute to a
perception of the social and political system as rigged, stimulating
belief in both identity‐relevant and irrelevant conspiracy theories.
The present findings make two novel contributions. First, these
findings provide direct evidence for the notion that marginalized
minorities are more susceptible to conspiracy theories even when
these theories are conceptually irrelevant for their marginalized status
in society (cf. Goertzel, 1994). As such, the study presented here may
666 VAN PROOIJEN ET AL.expand insights into the important question of how marginalized
minorities perceive, and function in, a society that deprives them of
equality. Second, the study presented here offers insights into the
question why marginalized minorities are more likely to believe con-
spiracy theories, by pointing at the independent roles of two levels
of deprivation. While the relationships between both forms of depri-
vation and conspiracy beliefs are correlational, these relationships
are consistent with other insights in the emerging field of conspiracy
theories (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; Graeupner & Coman, 2017; Van
Prooijen, 2018).5.1 | Limitations and future research
Given the difficulty of getting a large sample of marginalized minority
participants, the present contribution offers only one study. Yet our
study was well‐powered and displayed effects that are consistent with
previous insights on the relationship between minorities and conspir-
acy theories specifically (Bird & Bogart, 2003; Crocker et al., 1999;
Goertzel, 1994; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005) as well as of emotional
and social antecedents of conspiracy theories more generally (for
overviews, see Douglas et al., 2017; Van Prooijen, 2018). The effects
presented here hence are likely to replicate in follow‐up studies.
One limitation of our approach is that the empirical evidence for
our explanatory variables—personal and group‐based deprivation—is
correlational. Based on the study presented here, it is hence impossi-
ble to exclude the possibility of reverse causality (i.e., belief in conspir-
acy theories cause feelings of deprivation among minorities). While
this possibility does not explain the more general finding that margin-
alized minorities are highly susceptible to conspiracy theories, future
research may expand on our findings by investigating the causal
impact of both types of deprivation on conspiracy theories.
Furthermore, large parts of our minority sample was likely to
experience relatively high levels of deprivation, given their affiliation
with a political party focused on improving the rights of Muslims in
the Netherlands. Would minorities that do not feel marginalized differ
in their conspiracy beliefs from majority members? Our line of reason-
ing suggests that decreased feelings of deprivation among minority
members predict decreased conspiracy beliefs. Future research may
more explicitly focus on distinguishing between minority groups that
do and do not feel marginalized in society. Moreover, future research
may test whether the effects described here generalize to other types
of minorities that often experience deprivation (e.g., sexual minorities).6 | CONCLUSION
The results presented here fit into a research domain that seeks to
psychologically explain people's tendency to believe conspiracy theo-
ries (Douglas et al., 2017; Van Prooijen, 2018). Here, we highlighted
the role of marginalized minority status and found that (a) these
minorities are more susceptible to conspiracy theories, even when
these theories are irrelevant for their deprived standing in society,
and (b) both personal and group‐based deprivations contribute to con-
spiracy belief. We conclude that conspiracy theories are common
among both ethnic and Muslim minorities.ORCID
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